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Overview 
This paper examines the continuities and changes in Sudan’s political economy and political marketplace 
in the two years since the popular uprising that overthrew the regime of former president Omar al-
Bashir, and the subsequent formation of a military-civilian transitional government. The government 
of Sovereignty Council Chairman Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has the 
stated goals (among others) of transitioning to full civilian government, achieving peace with armed 
groups, and stabilizing and reforming the economy. Progress has been achieved on all these fronts. 
Nonetheless, key aspects of Sudan’s political economy remain unchanged, especially underlying 
hyper-exploitation of labour and natural resources, a prominent role for businesses associated with 
the leaders of the security sector, and peace agreements incentivized by promises of material rewards 
provided through governmental office. Transactional politics continue to trump institutional and civic 
politics, making it harder to reform these aspects of an inequitable and predatory economy.
Section I looks at the historically structural pattern of economic inequality in Sudan, whereby a political-
commercial elite has dominated the peripheries, extracting resources and distorting the possibilities 
for equitable and sustainable development. One consequence of this unequal growth path this was 
the emergence of a ferocious and colourfully corrupt transactional politics – a political marketplace. 
Corruption and violence have long been instruments of organizing Sudan’s economic life, allowing 
political-military leaderships to control rent and resource flows by buying loyalty in the militarized 
and conflict-prone peripheries where much of Sudan’s wealth is generated, and using coercion to 
rig markets on trade routes and cities where its wealth is sold or exported. The political marketplace 
framework (PMF) explains how the logic of such a predatory political economy has penetrated the 
conduct of politics itself, turning political power – public office, political services and allegiances – into 
commodities to be traded.
Section II turns to the political turmoil during and after the fall of President Omar al-Bashir. An uprising 
coordinated at the grassroots was captured by elites. The protesters’ slogans included, ‘Down with the 
rule of thieves’ – they were determined to root out kleptocracy and corruption as well as autocracy. 
However, the military, paramilitary and security elites were able to use their control over violence and 
money, as well as their lack of inhibition in creating facts on the ground, to take control of the transition. 
The civilian opposition and the cabinet of technocrats whom they installed were not capable of seizing 
the political moment. Two years after the overthrow of al-Bashir, there is no stable political settlement 
– rather a fragmented and turbulent political arena. The arrival in Khartoum of the leaders of armed 
groups, subsequent to the Juba peace agreement, and the formation of a new cabinet, have added 
new dynamics.
Section III turns to the budget crisis that was inherited by the incoming government and deepened 
rapidly in its first months in power. It examines how the logic of the political marketplace overwhelmed 
the aspirations of the reformers, and how the fiscal and monetary reforms implemented by the 
government, while they may achieve macro-economic stabilization, do not prefigure the kinds of 
structural changes to Sudan’s political economy that could enable the country to escape from its trap 
of conflict and impoverishment.
Section IV examines the Juba Agreement between the government and elements of the armed 
opposition. The way in which the negotiations were conducted and the content of the agreement 
reached shows that the transactional style of politics exemplified by the military – and especially 
by Hemedti – have prevailed at the expense of a transformational agenda of peace. This section 
focuses on the security sector, showing how the agreement will expand rather than contract Sudan’s 
security forces. It explores the conditions under which security sector reform – a key demand of the 
democracy movement and the armed groups – might become a feasible option.
Section V is a case study of the dynamics of Eastern Sudan, exploring the drivers of conflict and 
turbulence in that strategically important region. It highlights the perverse incentives of the Juba 
Agreement, which fuel further local conflict.
The final section draws some general conclusions. Recent developments crystallize a retreat from the 
transformational goals of the revolution and a regression to political business as usual.
This paper should be read as an elaboration and update on the August 2019 paper, ‘Sudan: A political 
marketplace framework analysis,’1 and a deeper dive into key issues. It is not a comprehensive analysis. 
Notably, it does not include an analysis of the deepening turmoil in Darfur, and neither does it address 
the position of Sudan in the fast-shifting politics of the Horn of Africa and the Nile Valley. 
1  De Waal 2019.
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I. An Inequitable and Predatory Political Economy
There is a long history of political scientists analyzing the disparities between centre and periphery in 
Sudan and identifying the predatory practices of an elite class, combining businessmen, government 
officials and military officers, as a cause of poverty and violent resistance in the peripheries. The 
hyper-exploitation of southern Sudan was only one instance of this long-standing phenomenon. In 
the wake of the secession of southern Sudan, these predatory systems did not change – if anything 
they intensified within Sudan’s now-truncated peripheries. This section explores what this has meant, 
and continues to mean, for the Sudanese political marketplace. It emphasizes that the 2019 civic 
revolution did not change these structures, and indeed it is arguable that the leaders of both the civilian 
parties and the security state whom they confronted, agreed tacitly that these structures should not 
essentially change, but should rather be rescued from the threat posed by the macro-economic crisis.
The disparities and interconnections between Sudan’s different sectors, regions and workforces
The following subsection uses import and export data (the most readily available statistical series 
in Sudan) to illustrate the interconnections and disparities between different sectors, regions and 
workforces which underlie Sudan’s political marketplace. The services sector – which includes 
activities like trade, transport, construction, administration, education, health and tourism – dominates 
the economy. In 2020, services made up 58 percent of GDP, whereas agriculture and industry each 
made up about 21 percent of GDP.2 But services make a negligible or negative contribution to the 
balance of payments – in any case, services exports are overwhelmingly dominated by transport and 
travel services.3 
Rural producers in the agricultural and extractive industries provide Sudan with its foreign currency 
earnings. For much of the twentieth century, Sudan’s earned most of its foreign exchange from a 
few crops grown on commercial, export-oriented, partially mechanized farms on irrigated and rainfed 
lands. These lands lie around the infrastructural centre of the state: in the riverain areas north and 
south of Khartoum, and along the railway lines and roads linking the capital to the ports on the Red 
Sea coast. 
During Sudan’s oil boom, which lasted from 1999 until 2011, the services sector depended on the 
industrial sector for nearly all foreign exchange. In many years, oil accounted for over 90 percent of 
earnings. Oil was produced by a small, highly-paid and technically-skilled workforce in a handful of 
remote oil enclaves. These enclaves were cleared of their populations by underpaid militias whose 
members had left the agricultural labour force. 
Sudan lost most of its oil production in 2011, when South Sudan became independent. In the years 
since 2012, Sudan’s foreign earnings have come from four main sources: gold (and a small quantity of 
other metals); petroleum products; and agriculture, which includes crops, animal products, and gum 
Arabic, collected from savannah forests (Sudan produces about 70 percent of the world’s supply).4 
Sudan’s gold boom took off after 2012, and during the boom, militia leaders took much greater control 
over a huge number of gold enclaves spread out across the country, especially in Darfur, reconfiguring 
provincial security forces in the process. This also restructured flows of political finance.5 The gold 
prospecting workforce is much bigger and less technically skilled than the petroleum workforce, and 
draws heavily on the agricultural workforce. 
The disparities between sectoral contributions to GDP and to export earnings is paralleled by disparities 
between regional contributions of GDP. The locus of production of exportable wealth keeps shifting 
across the countryside. 
For much of the twentieth century, export earnings were generated from farms located around the 
infrastructural centre of the colonial state. During the oil boom, export earnings were generated from 
natural resource enclaves in the south and its borderlands. And today, export earnings come from all 
over the place: gold mines in Darfur, Kordofan and the Ethiopian and Egyptian borderlands; livestock 
and forest goods, mostly from Darfur and Kordofan and the east, petroleum from the southern 
borderlands, and sesame and cotton, from the irrigated and rainfed lands that lie along the river and 
2  MOFEP 2020a: 4
3  Data query at https://comtrade.un.org/data/
4  Pilling 2021
5  De Waal 2019.
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the railway. Sudanese governments are constantly improvising new systems of extraction, and structural 
adjustment policies support that improvisation, reorganizing incentives for producers and exporters 
through changes to currency values, money supply and government spending.
Sudan’s export and import data helps to explain the sectoral and regional distribution of production and 
consumption. During Sudan’s oil boom the value of Sudan’s imports (in current US dollars) increased 
more than five-fold. In 2011, the oil boom came to an end, Sudan lost a third of its territory, a quarter of its 
population, and 90 percent of its hard currency. But despite this enormous territorial, demographic and 
economic contraction, imports rose. It was an indicator of the fundamental role of central consumption 
and the negligible role of peripheral consumption in the balance of payments. 
Figure 1: Commodity imports and exports, 2000-2019, billions of current US dollars6
Import data shows the centrality of urban consumption in the export economy. The graph below shows 
Sudan’s imports by value in 2019 – they are heavily skewed towards urban consumption. Petroleum 
products too are mostly consumed in the cities: rural Sudan depends on wood and charcoal.7 Wheat is 
mostly consumed in cities: urban consumers prefer the convenience – and higher cultural status – of 
wheat bread to the sorghum and millet porridges of rural Sudan. But most wheat is imported – using 
foreign currencies mostly earned by rural producers.8 Machinery and equipment imports in 2019 included 
tractors worth US$ 221.2 million, and electrical appliances, refrigerators, air conditioners, TVs and radios 
worth US$ 523.8 million. Sudan spent US$ 66.3 million on perfumes and cosmetics, just under half the 
US$ 151.0 million it spent on agricultural fertilizers. 
Figure 2: Total imports in 2019 by value, millions of US dollars (current)9
6  Derived from CBOS Foreign Trade Statistical Digest, 2001-2019
7  IEA 2021
8  Thomas and el-Gizouli 2020
9  Derived from CBOS Foreign Trade Statistical Digest, 2001-2019
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Government officials promised in February 2021 to raise tariffs on luxury goods.10 But Sudan’s problem 
is not perfumes or air conditioners, but the complicated and often violent process of turning rural 
surpluses into foreign exchange that pays for the basic food and energy needs of urban consumers. 
Labour data shed light on the problem. The 2011 labour force survey (most recent data) was a fuzzy 
snapshot of a workforce transitioning from an oil economy to something more complicated. It found 
that the agricultural sector employed 46 percent of the workforce, and the services sector employed 
40 percent. About two-thirds of services-sector workers are urban, and about two-thirds of agricultural 
workers are rural. Gender disparities are striking: nationally, about 70 percent of all agricultural workers 
are women, and nearly all rural women workers – 81 percent – are agricultural workers.11 Sudan’s 
demand for foreign currency places heavy burdens on women farmers. 
Understanding these labour burdens requires an understanding of the disparities and interconnections 
of Sudan’s agricultural sector. Animal husbandry makes up most of agricultural GDP and half of 
agricultural exports. Pastoralism is practiced across the country, with major concentrations in the 
south and west. Much of the livestock is raised by mobile or nomadic pastoralists who organize 
production using labour from the household or kin. But markets are changing things. Global demand 
for sheep is reshaping herds and migration routes: sheep made up 60 percent of Sudan’s expanding 
livestock export sector in 2019.12 In many areas, pastures have been enclosed by farmers, and 
pastoralist livelihoods are under pressure from climate change and conflict and new needs for cash.13 
The household production system divides up work between men and women, but many men are 
migrating out of pastoralism, and one recent study of pastoralist communities in Western Darfur 
found that signs that young girls were increasingly working as herders, replacing absent, migrant 
young men.14
The girls working in their brothers’ place in Western Darfur are not the only females taking on the 
burden of increasing rural production. Most Sudanese farmers work in the ‘traditional’ sub-sector, 
which spreads out over an estimated 9 million hectares, more than the semi-mechanized and irrigated 
sub-sectors combined. Like the pastoralists, farming households traditionally mobilized their labour 
from kinship and social networks and supplied their own needs. But now their production is being 
oriented towards markets. Average households in agrarian states source nearly all their food from 
markets, paid or indebted workers are replacing cousins and neighbours, and access to land is being 
reshaped by conflict, displacement and money.15 
This move towards markets is not an easy process for Sudan’s predominantly female farmers. Their 
families are hungry: even in bumper harvests, hunger increases in the agrarian states.16 Gender relations 
in the agricultural production have been reshaped by male migration from ‘traditional’ to mechanized 
farms: young men were forced by conflict or hunger or cash needs towards distant commercial farms. 
More recently, the agricultural sector has been losing primarily male workers to the security and 
mining sectors, and to harsh urban labour markers, are reshaping gender relations in rural Sudan.17 
In 2014, the Sudanese authorities estimated that about one million workers (about 11 percent of 
the total workforce) were working in gold mining. In mining areas of Eastern Sudan, the gold rush 
emptied whole villages of men, and the defence minister complained in parliament that gold rushes 
were undermining army recruitment.18 Thousands of children dropped out of school to join the rush.19 
Many of these transitions from agriculture to other sectors are likely to put more pressure on women 
farmers. 
10  Radio Dabanga, 22 Feb 2021
11  Farah 2013: 15
12  CBOS 2019, Abdel-Jalil 2008: 17
13  Behnke and Osman 2012: 7, 60
14  Suleiman and Young 2019: 20
15  WFP 2019: 11, 15
16  Thomas and El Gizouli 2020
17  Farah 2013: 15
18  Thomas 2017: 34
19  Elbadawi and Suliman 2018: 7
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Reorganizing rural production
The Sudanese government and the urban population depend heavily on the foreign currency earned 
by rural workers. Between 2014 and 2019, 97 percent Sudan’s commodity export earnings come from 
the mines, farms, pastures and forests of rural Sudan – and commodity exports made up nearly all 
exports. 
Figure 3: Total commodity exports by category, 2014-19, thousands of current US dollars20
Every time Sudan has signed up to a Staff-Monitored Programme with the IMF, it has committed itself 
to the reorganization of domestic production in order to increase exports and foreign earnings and 
pay back debts. 
In the 1970s, the government tried to reorganize rural production through investment, rather than 
violence. Neighbouring countries and international financial institutions poured loans into the 
country, believing that an influx of capital would modernize agriculture and turn the country into their 
breadbasket for its neighbours. Private lenders backed the oil industry, and western countries backed 
Sudan because of its Cold War stance.21 By 1985, Sudan’s foreign debts stood at about 9 billion US 
dollars, at interest rates over 10 percent.22 It was suspended and then expelled from international 
financial institutions. Agriculture went into decline, for a host of factors ranging from the climate crisis, 
poor infrastructure maintenance, and exchange-rate regimes skewed against farmers. Agricultural 
policy shifted restlessly from private to public sector and then back again, without reversing the decline.
Sudan undertook a pitiless programme of austerity and began using violence to reorganize domestic 
production. It stopped investing in rural production. At the same time the government raced to clear the 
oilfields of troublesome locals, helping spark armed resistance, and creating a cycle of violent asset-
stripping whereby merchants and army officers ramped up extraction to pay for military operations 
and the central government squeezed whatever productive sectors it could grasp for taxes, while the 
war/extraction policy in turn transformed Sudan’s security forces. The regular military expanded in 
size, but it mostly organized fighting through militias based on ethnic or sectarian affiliation. Such 
militias, compensated with loot or control of natural resource enclaves – became a key technique of 
governance, in a pattern familiar, if less extreme, across Africa and the Middle East during the era of 
structural adjustment. Managing this ensemble of militias required a new approach to government 
finance – political budgets that could be transferred easily to insecure areas and used to buy violence 
or loyalty or ensure continuity of extractive services. 
In 1997, the government was readmitted to the IMF, when its total external (or foreign) public debt 
stood at US$ 21.6 billion.23 Most of that was interest on the 9 billion dollars debt which the government 
had contracted before 1985. Today’s public external debt – estimated at between about US$ 60 billion 
– is still mostly interest on loans taken out forty years ago to reorganize agricultural development. 
20  Derived from CBOS Foreign Trade Statistical Digest, 2001-2019
21  Boughton 2001: 777
22  Jubilee Debt Campaign 2017
23  IMF 1998: 36
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How agricultural workers contribute to Sudan’s export earnings
Sudan is one of the world’s top ten sesame producers and exporters. Sorghum imports, which 
amounted to 5 percent of total formal commodity exports at the end of the oil boom in 2012, have 
soared. In 2019, they amounted to 19.4 percent of Sudan’s total formal commodity exports. The area 
planted to sesame has dramatically increased too.24 
Sudan is one of the least efficient sesame producers in the world, however. Yields are around 0.2 or 
0.3 metric tons per hectare: about a third of Tanzanian or Nigerian yields, and less than a fifth of Italian 
yields.25 In 2019/20, it produced about 1.2 million metric tons of sesame. Just over half of production 
came from the traditional sector. Traditional farmers in Darfur had the best yields – over 0.4 metric 
tons per hectare. Smaller farmers are better able to deal with the weeds and floods which hit the 2019 
crop badly. But overall, yields in the traditional and semi-mechanized sectors are just about the same.26 
In 2019, sesame yields in semi-mechanized farms in Gedaref, Kassala and Sinnar were less than 
half those on traditional farms in Western, Southern and Eastern Darfur.27 Many of the farm workers 
producing sesame for export have undergone long, impoverished journeys and family separations in 
order to increase Sudan’s sesame production. But commercial farms, often leased by well-connected 
traders and security men, are oriented towards quick profits rather than sustainable development.
‘Semi-mechanized’ agriculture lies at the heart of Sudan’s agricultural productivity puzzle. It mostly 
takes place on the fertile rainfed clay soils of central Sudan. City people with money and connections 
can lease huge tracts of these lands from the government. ‘Semi-mechanized’ means that ploughing 
is done by tractor, but all the rest of the work is done by hand. Leaseholders depend on a steady supply 
of landless workers to farm them. Several decades of displacement from Sudan’s peripheries, driven 
by conflict, environmental crisis and poverty, have provided them with a stable labour supply. Although 
the leaseholders, unlike the traditional farmers, have some access to capital from agricultural banks, 
they do not seem to be using capital to improve productivity. Cheap labour and privileged access to 
land secures their profits and allows them to compete with Italian and Tanzanian farmers. 
Sudanese sesame: area harvested (million hectares) and production (million metric tons).28
24  CBOS 2012, 2019
25  FAOSTAT 2021
26  MARN 2021: 23-24
27  MARN 2020: 24
28  FAOSTAT 2021
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Sudan’s new peace agreement, which is discussed below, set up a national committee for housing and 
services in the migrant farm workers’ kombos (camps) – a long overdue recognition that inequities 
in agriculture are a vital peace issue.29 But the finance ministry’s three year plan pays little attention 
to the traditional farm workers who produce half the country’s lucrative sesame crop, and none to the 
landless workers on commercial farms who produce the other half of the crop, almost as laboriously.30 
Many of these workers are hungry. The March 2021 food security assessment from the Famine Early 
Warning Systems Network reported that economic reforms were driving food price inflation: ‘The 
most affected households are daily wage laborers and poor farming and agropastoral communities, 
and IDPs and conflict-affected people in Darfur, South Kordofan, parts of Blue Nile.’31 Many have been 
laid off because of the Covid-19-related economic downturn. 
But these workers are going to have to work harder if the country is to stabilize its currency, make big 
debt repayments, and bring down the inflation rate and the balance of payments deficit – because 
these workers produce most of the country’s foreign currency. Over the five years from 2019-23, the 
IMF projects that exports will almost double in value, and the ratio of public debt service to exports will 
increase even more sharply.32 That foreign currency is likely to be earned from actually existing sources 
– agriculture and extractive industries – until new sources of foreign currency emerge. Maintaining 
and expanding Sudan’s foreign currency earnings is not a static process – it requires the constant 
application of new pressures on Sudan’s hungry producers. 
Production, taxation and violence
A structure of coercion – implicit and explicit – plays a role in Sudan’s agricultural export expansion. 
The central government does not formally tax agricultural producers,  just as it does not formally 
tax the urban informal economy. The squeeze operates through commercial agriculture and mining, 
backed by the law, and at certain times and in certain places by soldiers, paramilitaries, police and 
militia.
Primary producers in remote areas of Sudan are alert to signals from world markets.  Sesame made up 
half of all exported crops in 2019, and land under sesame cultivation increased dramatically between 
2011 and 2019. But responding to these signals often comes at significant cost for primary producers. 
Much of the sesame, for example, is produced on ‘semi-mechanized’ commercial farms on the clay 
plains of the east. These workers are paid so little that commercial farmers have little incentive to 
invest in productivity improvements and, as mentioned above, increased production involves further 
over-exploitation of both land and labour.
This exploitation is further deepened because Sudan’s capitalists escape regulation and taxation 
wherever they can, making private profit at the expense of deepening public debt and more ruthless 
extraction from soil and farm workers. As much as half of Sudan’s foreign trade escapes government 
scrutiny due to mis-invoicing and smuggling.33
Sudan’s revenues from taxation, as a share of GDP, are among the lowest in the world. It is an extreme 
example of the phenomenon whereby much of the wealth of the governing classes and their allies 
is accumulated off-budget.34 In the 1970s, taxes amounted to 15 percent of GDP.35 That figure fell to 
about 6 percent in the 1980s. During Sudan’s oil boom, the low tax take was offset by oil revenues, 
which were straightforward for the government to collect, as all the oil ran down a single pipeline 
guarded by oil police. But the end of the oil era created a major problem for tax revenue. Tax revenues 
declined sharply in 2020 amounting to only 4 percent of GDP.36 For comparison, in 2017, the average 
tax take across Sub-Saharan African countries amounted to 18.9 percent of GDP.37
29  Agreement on National Issues, Article 14
30  MOFEP 2021: 21-29
31  FEWSNET 2021b
32  IMF 2020: 26, 9
33  Global Financial Integrity 2020.
34  IMF 2020: 6
35  World Bank 1979: iii
36  MOFEP 2020a: 5, 7, 29
37  World Bank 2021a
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The 2021 budget complained of an increase in the smuggling of gold, sesame, sorghum, gum Arabic 
and petroleum products.38 But smuggling is only part of the government revenue problem. Government 
efforts to expand the tax base have not succeeded. The well-connected routinely negotiate tax 
exemptions for private FDI and state-owned enterprises on the rationale that they are intended to 
boost production and export. The war years expanded Sudan’s security forces, made Sudan’s civil 
government lean, and re-introduced military and paramilitary units as a component of relations of 
production in the areas of sustained counter-insurgency. As the state divested from sectors like 
agriculture and pastoralism, and it militarized the governance of the peripheries. Government militias 
raised taxes from checkpoints and village patrols, and opposition militias followed their example. In 
parts of Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, terms of employment for labourers – especially 
displaced people and those deprived of citizenship after the separation of the South – have been 
enforced at the point of a gun. The outsourced militia governance system used rural production 
systems to finance itself, as the government withdrew from the conflict zones of the periphery. 
The shift from an oil economy to a gold economy exposed the weakness of the government’s fiscal 
position. It could no longer rely on the oil pipeline to keep revenues flowing. It needed a system to 
control gold revenues from thousands of mines across the country. In the 1990s, natural resource 
enclaves were guarded by local militias, but after 2011, those militias gradually took control of the 
state. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by vice-president Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, also known as 
Hemedti, started out as a government-aligned militia drawn from landless pastoralist groups during 
the dirty war in Darfur. After South Sudan became independent, the RSF led a successful counter-
insurgency campaign which expelled most opposition forces from Darfur and contained opposition 
forces in other areas of Sudan. 
In the process, the RSF began securing control over rural production, making itself indispensable 
to government at both local and national levels. Its main commercial arm, Algunade (al-Junayd), is 
chaired by the vice-president’s brother (a brigadier in the RSF). The Daglo family’s massive commercial 
expansion was driven by windfall profits from gold and the military services it sold to patrons in Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, for operations in Yemen. It was not, however, politically unsustainable to keep those 
revenue streams in private hands. Algunade has diversified its interests into transportation, malls, 
house construction, road construction, car rental and sale, real estate and agriculture. In October 2020, 
the ministry of finance officially took control of Algunade’s main artisanal mining site in North Darfur – 
a factory processing the gold-rich ore, known as ‘kerta,’ which is wasted in artisanal processing – and 
said the government would run the mine in ‘a constructive partnership’ with Algunade.39 
The Daglo family conglomerate has enough reserves to bail out the government when it runs into 
cashflow problems. In Darfur, doctors report that they travel to their duty stations on RSF flights and 
their salaries are paid by the RSF too. And the RSF has begun to intervene in the agricultural economy 
too. ‘RSF Continue securing harvest season in South Darfur’ was the headline on the RSF’s English-
language news website on 22 November 2020. Migrant agricultural workers from South Sudan report 
that the RSF informally taxes them on their route home from Darfur, but the RSF report goes as follows: 
RSF had visited all parts of north of the state included (Netaifa, Ban Jadeed , Merair, 
al-Seraif, Mandu, al-Naqeih) … Cap. Ibrahim Adam Ibrahim said that the securing of 
agriculture and harvest season represents top priority to the RSF … the RSF in South 
Darfur dispatched additional forces to the localities [which] consisted of 47 pick-up 
vehicles … to secure agriculture season and to protect the harvest.40 
Militia deployments in agricultural areas are a sign that market signals are not getting through to the 
agricultural workers in these locations. Sudan needs farm labourers to increase productivity in order 
to ramp up its exports of commodities, but its markets are not structured to provide adequate wages. 
Instead, market signals are filtered through oligopolies of agricultural employment or transmitted by 
direct coercion. In the breadbasket rainlands of Gedaref, the labour force has very limited space for 
38  MOFEP 2020a: 9
39  Radio Dabanga, 29 October 2020
40  RSF 22 November 2020
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bargaining over wages. In the far peripheries such as Southern Darfur where workers have traditionally 
had an ‘exit option’,  harvest-patrol coercion works more effectively than price mechanisms. 
The reason for this lies in what might be called Sudan’s two mixed economies and the boom-and-bust 
cycle of rural production.  
One of Sudan’s mixed economies works across public and private sectors, combining private capital, 
military capability, and preferential access to public offices (especially for issuing land leases and 
permits of all kinds). The military-commercial-public partnerships are highly responsive to marginal or 
transient economic opportunities that can be leveraged to gain windfall profits. Entire sectors of rural 
production—groundnuts in the past, sesame today, artisanal gold mining—rise and contract depending 
on global prices and supply chains. Sudanese capitalists want to seize their chances and are also 
aware that their investments may vanish as prices or circumstances change. Price signals become 
profit opportunities only when land and labour are over-exploited, where poor people are desperate 
and official regulations are repurposed for private gain. Merchant-officer partnerships are also keenly 
aware of chances for windfall profits that arise from asset seizure, smuggling and the price gouging in 
places where transport of commodities needs security permits or military escorts, and may engineer 
these circumstances themselves. In due course, these profiteers repatriate their capital to Khartoum 
and reinvest in legitimate businesses, while their paramilitaries are formalized as part of the security 
sector. The RSF is the latest and largest example of this historic pattern.
Meanwhile, a second mixed economy works across different systems of production. ‘Traditional’ 
production systems are based on household consumption needs and the unremunerated labour 
of the household and its kinship and social networks. If all the labour inputs were to be valued, 
these production systems would be classed as inefficient. However, Sudan’s commercial markets 
systematically undervalue natural resources – land and forests – while smallholder farmers place a 
higher value on them. Unsurprisingly, therefore, farm yields in the ‘traditional’ sector usually outperform 
commercial farm yields. 
This doubly-mixed economy is a product of several decades of attempts to increase revenues from 
Sudan’s complicated and fragmented production systems alongside the economic precarity and 
insecurity of the rural poor. Moving this system in the direction of ‘inclusive growth’ – the objective 
of the Sudanese government and its international partners – will take more than macroeconomic 
stability. 
Sudan’s recurrent experiments with structural adjustment are a bet that the medium-term payoff in 
terms of improved state finance and greater foreign direct investment will kick in before the pain 
of further immediate pressure on the wellbeing of labourers and small farmers becomes humanly 
unbearable – and politically intolerable. But the dice are loaded because of Sudan’s dependence on 
these few primary export commodities and because the labour market is so intrinsically coercive. 
The macro-economic planners in the Ministry of Finance and their counterparts in the international 
financial institutions don’t have the means to redress these unfair conditions, even should they want 
to do so.
In section IV we will examine the question of whether Sudan’s peace agreement can help the country 
reset the relationships between Sudan’s different workforces and regions.
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II. Regime Change and Shifting Political Alignments 
During 2019, the goal of the principal military, paramilitary, security and commercial actors who were 
well-placed within the al-Bashir government was to retain as much as possible of their power and 
material reward and if possible turn the revolutionary moment to their advantage. While there were 
individual winners and losers, the structures of the old regime proved adept at adjusting to the new 
realities.
Reconfiguration of al-Bashir’s coalition: The 11 April 2019 coup and its consequences
The conditions of al-Bashir’s ouster set the stage for the current transitional period. For his political 
survival he balanced, and relied on, four institutions – the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the National Congress 
Party (NCP). They were simultaneously tools of rule and constituencies to be managed. The sustained 
but scattered protest movement which began in December 2018 accelerated in the early days of April 
2019, turning into mass mobilization which provided regime elites with the opportunity, cover, and 
compelling motivation to move against al-Bashir.
This was not the first uprising that sought to unseat the NCP government. Sudan’s diverse opposition 
groups had tried repeatedly to mobilize popular protests, but had come against internal mistrust, 
the systematic infiltration by NISS, and brutal repression. As many as 170 people had been killed in 
September 2013 when security forces opened fire on protesters.41 The 2018-19 uprising was different. 
It began in reaction to al-Bashir’s decision to lift bread subsidies, affecting areas, such as Atbara, which 
had been considered strongholds of the NCP. And as weeks went on, it did not abate, the statements 
of the Sudanese Professionals’ Association (SPA) – a coalition of trade unions – emerging as the 
focus of the movement. The demonstrations, in turn, catalysed unprecedented opposition unity: on 1 
January 2019, the main opposition forces, including political parties, armed groups, and civil society 
organizations such as the SPA, signed the Declaration of Freedom and Change. The document, which 
demanded the formation of a transitional government, the end of civil wars, and the convening of 
a constitutional conference, marked the birth of the Forces of Freedom of Change (FFC), a broad 
umbrella that could claim to speak for the majority of the Sudanese opposition.42
The members of the security cabal, including General Salah Gosh, head of NISS, did not initiate, 
welcome or control the popular protests. They were focused on internal conspiring to become al-
Bashir’s designated successor for when his term in office was due to expire in April 2020. Accustomed 
to the resilience of an authoritarian centralism and expecting the regime to outlast the popular protests 
with a mixture of co-option, minor concessions and repression, they tried to leverage the uprising for 
their narrow political purposes. Members of the FFC were also uncertain about the prospects for the 
uprising, and some believed that a managed transition in partnership with regime insiders was the 
best option.
The Declaration and growing international attention to the uprising in Sudan changed the calculation 
for regime insiders. In January 2019, Gosh  held multiple secret meetings with opposition leaders 
and civil society, expressing his support for a transition of power.43 He and his deputy manoeuvred to 
seek Egyptian and Emirati backing for a coup.44 It is widely held that he coordinated with opposition 
leaders to enable protesters to march to the headquarters of the military in central Khartoum. As 
night fell on a crowd unprecedented in recent memory, the demonstration turned to a sit-in which 
became the site of scenes of fraternization between protesters and junior SAF officers. Faced with the 
combined pressure from the protesters and the collapse of the internal consensus, al-Bashir became 
increasingly desperate. The leaders of the national security establishment—the army, NISS and RSF, 
staged a coup. On 11 April, a Transitional Military Council took power with Vice President and SAF Gen. 
Awad Ibn Auf as its leader.
41  Human Rights Watch, "We Stood, They Opened Fire": Killings and Arrests by Sudan’s Security Forces During the September 
Protests, report, 21 April 2014.
42  Declaration of Freedom and Change, 1 January 2019.
43  In January, Gosh travelled to Addis Ababa where he met Mo Ibrahim, a prominent British businessman of Sudanese descent, 
alongside Abdalla Hamdok, who would go on to become transition Prime Minister, and Salah Manna, from the Umma Party. That month, 
he also met FFC leaders in Kober prison.
Wadaa, Muhammed.  ‘can taṣrīḥāt ṣalāḥ manāc wa-liqā’ gosh …  ḥatā taktamal al-ṣūra [On the statements of Salah Mana and the meet-
ing with Gosh: to complete the picture]’, 5 August 2020, https://www.tagpress.net/46414/.
Reuters, ‘Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan’s Bashir was Destined to Fall’, Reuters, 3 July 2019.
44  Ibid. AP, ‘As Sudan uprising grew, Arab states worked to shape its fate’, 8 May 2019.
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The TMC comprised leaders of SAF, the RSF, and NISS, while excluding the NCP. In the days that 
followed, and under pressure from demonstrators which continued their sit-in around the military 
headquarters’, Ibn Auf resigned, leaving the TMC’s leadership to Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Three 
other TMC members, including NISS general Jalal al-Din al-Sheikh, also resigned.45 Salah Gosh, a 
central target of the ire of demonstrators, resigned and withdrew from public view. These moves left 
NISS without an influential figure in or around the TMC.
These crucial days resulted in a durable reconfiguration of the balance of power among institutions 
inherited from the Bashir era – the TMC, from then on, would rest upon two dominant poles: the SAF, 
led by al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Hemedti, holding together in an uneasy alliance. Leaders of 
the NCP such as Ali Osman Taha, Awad al-Jaz and Ahmed Haroun were placed under house arrest 
alongside other leaders of the so-called ‘Islamic movement’, including former NCP stalwarts who had 
fallen out of favour under Bashir (such as Nafi Ali Nafi). Control over the personnel and assets of NISS 
went on to become an arena for competition between SAF and the RSF. Behind a façade of continuity, 
the emergence of the TMC restructured the internal dynamics of institutions inherited from al-Bashir’s 
government. Two new logics of actions came to prevail: a struggle to block, slow, or roll back the 
opposition’s efforts to democratize or ascertain civilian role; and a muffled competition for dominance 
between the leadership of SAF and that of the RSF. 
The Constitutional Declaration: A New Ruling Coalition
The TMC sought to rapidly consolidate a military authoritarian regime, in the face of continuing 
demands from the democracy movement for a civilian government. On 3 June 2019 it sent security 
forces, including the RSF, the Central Reserve Police, and police forces, to clear the revolutionary sit-in. 
The continued presence of tens of thousands of demonstrators in front of the army’s headquarters 
expressed the mobilized public’s demand for democratizing change and represented a key resource 
for the FFC in its negotiations with the TMC. But the massacre failed to cow demonstrators who 
returned to the streets by the hundreds of thousands on 30 June. If the generals had somehow 
believed that they steered events in early April, they now realized that the democracy movement could 
not be repressed, fooled or manipulated.
The TMC’s key backers – the Arab Troika of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – also realised that 
they had both underestimated and mistaken the democracy movement. None of the troika looked 
favourably on democracy, but they also recognized that Sudan’s civic movement was determined to 
dismantle the country’s Islamic movement and not provide space for it to take over the revolution. The 
U.S. and U.K., meanwhile, awoke to the dangers of a military-led counter-revolution and realised that 
they had little communication with, or understanding of, the TMC. The quartet of the U.S., U.K., Saudi 
Arabia and UAE coordinated pressure on the TMC and FFC to come to a power-sharing agreement 
in rapid time. Their efforts were assisted by two African envoys (representing the African Union and 
IGAD) who had little leverage but had a mandate from the AU Peace and Security Council, and who had 
drafted a compromise document drawing on the negotiating positions of the two parties just prior to 
the crackdown.
The deal, known as the Constitutional Declaration, was signed in August and marked the emergence 
of a new ruling coalition bringing together SAF, the RSF, and most of the urban-based political parties 
that had opposed al-Bashir, ranging from the conservative Umma Party, to the Communist Party, and 
Ba’athist and Nasserist factions.
The bargaining process which preceded the signing of the declaration had traced the contours of this 
coalition. In April, the FFC’s political parties and the SPA largely took charge of negotiations with the 
TMC, prompting civil society components to complain that they had been side-lined. The armed groups 
from Sudan’s peripheries, which were formally part of the FFC, faced similar exclusion. The uprising 
had largely caught them off guard. Throughout the summer, the armed groups sought to convince 
the political parties to endorse a power-sharing agreement which included them and addressed the 
demands of Sudan’s peripheral regions. In meetings with the FFC in Addis Ababa over July and August, 
they worked out a ‘peace chapter’, agreeing on a wording on the eve of the signing of the Constitutional 
Declaration. The armed groups discovered the next day that the chapter had been relegated to the 
penultimate article of the text. This reflected the longstanding metropolitan assumption that civilian 
control over the instruments of power was the central problem, and everything would flow from such 
45  Abdelaziz, Khalid. ‘Three members of Sudan military council resign after demand by opposition,’ Reuters, 24 April 2019. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKCN1S02D8 
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a change. ‘That was the main rupture in [the] relationship between the armed movements and the FFC,’ 
said an armed group representative.46 
The institutional formula that emerged from the Constitutional Declaration preserved a central role 
for the existing military and security apparatus, giving al-Burhan the position of de facto head of state, 
and preserving military control over all defence and security matters. It also testified to the reluctance 
of the FFC’s parties to endorse the prospect of a rapid turn to electoral politics. From the onset of 
negotiations, senior FFC figures had argued that a transition of three to four years was necessary 
in order to uproot what they called the ‘deep state’. Underlying this was the memory of how the 
conservative sectarian parties had rapidly mobilized for elections after previous civic uprisings in 1964 
and 1985, marginalizing the more radical groups that had actually brought down the military regimes 
in question. The FFC leaders dismissed the view that a long transition could facilitate an authoritarian 
backlash.47 The Constitutional Declaration, in the end, planned for a 39-month transition.
The state’s deep fiscal crisis and the reality that the most profitable remaining sectors of the economy 
were outside the control of civilian state institutions meant that cabinet positions offered limited 
prospects for personal rewards or the establishment of political budgets for newcomers. The FFC 
parties’ elites also appeared to have seen the economic situation as a technical problem best left 
to administrators rather than as a political issue whose outcome would affect the success of the 
transition. They proved reluctant to take responsibility for the day-to-day management of the country. 
Abdalla Hamdok, a UN economist, was appointed Prime Minister leading a largely technocratic 
cabinet; senior political figures, such as Siddig Youssef (Communist Party), and Omar al-Digeir and 
Ibrahim al-Shaikh (Sudan Congress Party), while former Prime Minister Sadig al-Mahdi (Umma party), 
took no official position.
The divorce between the FFC parties and the armed groups had left the issue of peace unresolved. 
The Constitutional Declaration made it a priority – but ‘comprehensive peace issues’ were only spelled 
out in chapter 15 of the sixteen chapters of the declaration. The sequence of bargaining between the 
FFC and the TMC had barely ended that another opened, as a government delegation led by Hemedti 
went to Juba to meet with armed groups. In September 2019, they signed the Juba Declaration, a 
document paving the way for ‘comprehensive’ talks, scheduled to end within six months, but which 
went on to last more than a year.
International Realignments
Al-Bashir had long skilfully navigated the shifting tides of Arab politics and remained on sufficiently 
good terms with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (‘the Arab Troika’) and also Qatar and Turkey (the 
Islamist coalition) to be able to secure some support from each camp. In 2018, he was cornered, 
antagonizing the Saudis and Emiratis, without being able to draw on any alternative patrons.48
 The revolutionary moment was, for the Arab Troika, a moment to win Sudan over to its side. For the 
UAE in particular it was an opportunity to extend its influence into a country where its role had been 
secondary, and in due course to leverage its own role to secure Sudanese recognition of Israel.
The 11 April coup had received the backing of the Arab Troika, and in the aftermath of the Constitutional 
Declaration the transitional authorities closely aligned with them, freezing much of their relations with 
Turkey and Qatar. The Trump Administration had been happy to delegate much of its power in the 
Red Sea to Israel and the Troika, at a time when the area was growing into a strategic arena for 
the competition among regional and international powers, including Qatar, Turkey, Russia, and China. 
Sudan’s affiliate status in the pro-U.S. axis became a fait accompli, even as the U.S. designation of 
Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 to October 2020 continued to pose an obstacle to 
full normalization.
Europeans welcomed the constitutional declaration and rushed to meet Hamdok and his Finance 
Minister Ibrahim al-Badawi, a World Bank economist who spearheaded reforms aimed at securing the 
approval of donors and international financial institutions to debt relief. For Europeans, the transition 
was a ‘good news story’ which, alongside the Nobel Peace Prize of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed, fitted into a narrative about reformist leaders in the Horn of Africa. Expressions of support to 
46  Phone interview with an official from the SPLM-N – Agar branch, 27 March 2020.
47  Interview with Communist Party leader Siddig Youssef; with a leader of the Sudan Congress Party, Khartoum, April 2019.
48  Gallopin 2019.
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Sudan’s ‘civilian-led transitional government’ also allowed Europeans to turn a page, at little cost, from 
the controversies surrounding cooperation with the Bashir government to curb migration.
After the TMC gave way to mixed civilian-military institutions, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stopped their 
direct support to Sudan, having given US$ 750m (including US$ 500m to the central bank) of $3 billion 
they had promised when the TMC assumed power.49 Gulf support had kept al-Bashir afloat throughout 
much of the 2010s, which means that the interruption of Saudi and Emirati payments forced the 
Sudanese authorities to continue to monetize the debt and directly contributed to the acceleration of 
inflation (European countries and the U.S. refused to provide direct cash support to the government, 
choosing instead to finance humanitarian and development programmes run by cooperation agencies, 
NGOs, or private companies). But the leaders of the military and security apparatus continued 
to benefit from the patronage of the Arab Troika. The UAE propped up al-Burhan in February 2020 
when it brokered a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a move which advanced 
normalization of ties between Sudan and Israel, facilitated the rapprochement between the U.S. and 
Sudan – and also undermined Hamdok. Divisions nevertheless played out within the Troika as al-
Burhan and Hemedti jockeyed for favours. Hemedti enjoyed the backing of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
and was able to position himself as the broker for potentially supplying Sudanese fighters to Libya, 
further embedding himself within the international mercenary supply business. Al-Burhan and the 
military drew on the support of Egypt. Over 2020, as the military worked to curb the influence of the 
RSF, Egypt reportedly promised al-Burhan to lobby Saudi Arabia to switch its patronage to him.
Institutional paralysis and fragmentation
The Constitutional Declaration and the appointment of highly-respected technocrats as Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance raised hopes among Sudanese that the country’s macro-economic problems 
could be fixed outside of the kleptocratic ‘real politics’ that had brought the country to the crisis it was 
in. That was an unrealistic hope. While PM = Hamdok and Finance Minister al-Badawi—two expert 
economists of the highest standing—served in cabinet, real economic decision-making in 2019-20 
laid in the hands of a secondary school graduate and entrepreneur, Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti.’ Not 
only did Hemedti have the cash in hand but he had a street-smart sense of how the political market 
operated. In the turbulent, poorly-institutionalized context of the transition, transactional politics with 
its short-term returns trumped technocratic institutional governance. Hamdok and al-Badawi’s vision 
of macroeconomic stabilization followed by development wasn’t necessarily wrong—they just did not 
have the political-institutional foundation on which to pursue it. When the Covid-19 pandemic struck, 
Hemedti headed up the Higher Committee for the Economic Emergency. Only in 2021 with international 
financial normalization did the Ministry of Finance have a sufficiently strong hand to reassert control.
Al-Badawi announced in December 2019 a budget that would gradually lift subsidies on fuel. This 
was a key demand of the international financial institutions and donors, and a crucial step to curb the 
compound growth of budgetary deficits and dampen the monetary crisis, given that the subsidies were 
financed by monetization. Correctly anticipating that this would cause a sharp increase in the cost of 
living, the FFC leadership organized its opposition to al-Badawi. Military and paramilitary leaders, on 
the other hand, sought to re-assert their dominance. The dynamic was at play in September 2019, 
when Hemedti’s initiative in negotiating with the armed groups in Juba took the FFC by surprise and 
traced the outline of a potential alliance between armed groups and the military and security sector, 
which threatened the FFC and the project to civilian rule.
The solution for the FFC came in the creation of tripartite meetings involving them, the cabinet and the 
Sovereignty Council, where policy would be made. The mechanisms, in principle, offered the coalition 
the comfort of ‘leading from behind’. But it also implied that the FFC leaders faced no accountability for 
their actions. When confronted with crucial decisions, they fell prey to internal divisions. Disagreements 
over the economic policy pitted centrist parties, whether right-leaning (Umma Party) or left-leaning 
(Sudan Congress Party), which favoured the reform plans of the Ministry of Finance, against the left 
(Communist Party, Baathist and Nasserist factions), which opposed them but articulated few concrete 
proposals to address the currency crisis. The disagreements, in the end, merely delayed the Ministry 
of Finance’s plans. Unable to agree on their respective representation in the Transitional Legislative 
Council – a parliament of appointees responsible for law-making before the elections that will mark the 
49  Khalid Abdelaziz, ‘Sudan secures Saudi promise to deliver $1.5 billion in pledged aid—sources,’  Reuters,  11 March 2021, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-sudan-economy-saudi/sudan-secures-saudi-promise-to-deliver-1-5-billion-in-pledged-aid-sources-
idUSKBN2B31KV 
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end of the transition – the FFC postponed its creation, arguing that the council’s formation would wait 
for the conclusion of a peace agreement with armed groups. Hamdok also delayed the appointment 
of civilian governors – crucial in taking administrative levers outside of Khartoum away from the 
control of the military – until July 2020 because he anticipated, correctly, that the list of appointees 
drafted by the FFC would meet resistance in peripheral areas. Finally, the same kind of jockeying by 
which the FFC prioritized their internal competition over what were, on face value, shared objectives, 
such as promoting civilian rule or democratization, led the SPA to split after one faction accused the 
Communists of engineering a takeover.
While the tripartite committees preserved influence for the FFC, they also enabled the military to restore 
its central role in decision-making. Through them, the FFC renounced its biggest resource: the mobilized 
Sudanese public.  Though they had largely escaped the control of the FFC parties, the demonstrations 
of 2019 had underpinned the coalition’s influence. After the signing of the Constitutional Declaration, 
the FFC made no serious effort to maintain a high level of popular mobilization. Revolutionaries 
continued to organize regular protests against a context of inflation, fuel and bread shortages, and 
deteriorating public health conditions as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. On 30 June 2020, the first 
anniversary of the ‘March of the Million’ which had contributed to tip the scale in the FFC’s negotiations 
with the TMC, tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered in Khartoum and other cities, demanding 
that the government fulfil the demands of the revolution. But the cabinet and the FFC shied away from 
using the street in their tug-of-war with the military. 
The generals also maneuverer the emerging institutional order in their favour. The Constitutional 
Declaration had made the Prime Minister the ‘supreme executive authority of the state’, but in practice 
the Sovereignty Council and its head al-Burhan used the tripartite meetings to control the agenda. 
The military’s rejection of international oversight over issues such as security sector reform or the 
implementation of the Constitutional Declaration, for instance, forced Hamdok to backpedal on 
his request for a new UN mission in Sudan with a broad mandate. After Hamdok signed a political 
agreement with rebel leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, sovereignty council member Gen. Shams al-Din al-
Kabbashi (SAF) publicly denounced the deal, saying Hamdok had no mandate.
Throughout 2020 the dynamics of fragmentation within the FFC and the military’s claims to dominance 
threatened to make the FFC irrelevant. The problem was compounded by the continuing focus of 
some of the leftists, notably the Communists, with dismantling what they saw as continuing Islamist 
control over the so-called ‘deep state.’ In April 2020, the Umma Party announced it suspended its 
participation to the FFC’s ruling bodies. In November the Communist Party left. Remaining in the 
coalition were the Sudan Congress Party – a small party of Khartoum elites – as well as Nasserist 
and Baathist factions, segments of the Unionists, and some civil society components. None of these 
groups could hope to maintain their influence competitive elections, and had little incentives to pull the 
transition in that direction.
The post-technocratic government and the political marketplace
The government formed in August 2019 was a cabinet of technocrats. Eighteen months later, as the 
immediate consequence of the implementation of the Juba Agreement it was replaced by a cabinet 
of political appointees.
In October 2020, the government and a coalition of rebel movements signed the Juba Agreement. This 
opened the door to representatives of former rebel movements and traditional political parties joining 
the cabinet, alongside the security men in their secure positions (defence and internal affairs) leaving 
Hamdok as the remaining technocrat. 
The new cabinet acted fast. Its most striking decision was the unification of the official and free-
market exchange rates, a step at which Bashir’s government and the government of technocrats had 
baulked. Al-Badawi, a brilliant and supple economist, had not been able to push this through. The 
finance minister who enacted this controversial and painful step was Jibreel Ibrahim, a Japan-trained 
economist and leader of the Justice and Equality Movement. 
The cabinet now represents the main players in Sudan’s political market. It is an extension of the 
political bargaining over resources, not an attempt to transcend that. Some of the actors are hoping 
for reform: the finance ministry’s development plan for 2021-23, drafted in 2020, calls for the security 
forces to hand over control of their commercial companies which parasitically control many of Sudan’s 
productive sectors.50 Others may be hoping that the IMF’s repeat prescriptions will allow them to 
maintain control over resource flows, just as previous Staff-Monitored Programmes have done. 
50  MOFEP 2020b: 10
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Sudan’s young revolutionaries hope that revolution, new leaders and new peace agreements will 
transform their country’s economic system and replace the political marketplace with something 
more democratic and inclusive. But just as Sudan’s systems of production and trade are organized in 
a way which have thwarted the IMF’s repeat prescriptions, so too they threaten revolutionary hopes. 
At the heart of both – as argued above – is the role of coercion in structuring both political economy 
and political processes. The military/security-commercial complex was at the centre of the al-Bashir 
regime and it has used the post-Bashir transition to consolidate its hold. Economic reform and its 
impacts will be filtered through the legacy of a distorted, coercive political economy, and those that 
currently sit atop its structures.
III. Budget Crisis: Public and Political Finance
The lesson, re-learned during the eighteen months after the formation of a civilian cabinet in 2019, 
was that Sudan’s economic crisis is a political crisis. Had PM Hamdok had the unlimited power of 
a dictator he might have been able to impose a new, technocratic rationality on the country. Instead 
he is at the helm of an opaque state apparatus in which ministries control their own companies 
and bank accounts. Civilians in government have no oversight over the budgets of the military and 
security sector, which remain under the control of the generals of the former TMC. The generals, who 
appointed the ministers of Defence and Interior, dole out their contribution to the national budget on 
a discretionary basis.
Rent-seeking in subsidized imports
Beyond peripheral areas, the transition saw a continuation of the rent-seeking practices at the centre. 
Under al-Bashir, strategic exports and imports were lucrative foci for high-level corruption. In December 
2019, the government, having run out of foreign exchange to pay for subsidized imports, turned to Al-
Fakher, a small company with no track record in large-scale operations. In exchange for a deposit 
of 28 million dollars which enabled the government to release the cargo of stranded fuel tankers, 
the authorities gave the company access to Sudanese currency at parallel market rate. This gave Al-
Fakher a competitive advantage which allowed it to purchase gold on the local market at a premium, 
outbidding local competitors and establishing what other traders said was a de-facto monopoly 
on gold exports. The company reportedly used the proceeds to import subsidized fuel and wheat 
on lucrative government contracts. The scheme mirrored elements of Bashir’s previous economic 
strategy, under which the Central Bank’s purchased gold through agents, before exporting it to secure 
the hard currency which financed subsidized imports; only it privatized the potential profits from 
these exports, while nationalizing the costs via monetization. News of the deal prompted an intense 
domestic controversy regarding the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries of Al-Fakher. The company 
denied any links to the RSF. However, Hemedti had also personally deposited funds in the central bank.
Hemedti had, under influence from the UAE and Saudi Arabia,51 been appointed in April 2020 as the 
head of the Higher Committee on Economic Emergency. Two months later he created a ‘Strategic 
Goods Portfolio’: a body bringing together gold exporters (including the Dagalo’s Algunade), banks, 
and importers of subsidized goods, in order to finance such subsidized imports with proceeds from 
gold exports. The mechanism had the potential to limit rent-seeking by introducing an element of 
competition among importers. It also promised to curb inflation thanks to an obligation placed on 
importers of subsidized goods to provide the dollar-equivalent value of their imports in Sudanese 
pounds, a provision which would, in theory, soak up some of the currency put in circulation in previous 
years. The mechanism, however, remained opaque and, in the end, failed to address inflation.
The struggle over public finances
Civilians do not control the sprawling network of companies that SAF and the General Intelligence 
Service – the new manifestation of NISS – own via holding companies such as the Military Industry 
Corporation (MIC). The companies of the military and security sector operate across the economy, 
while entire sectors among the most productive of Sudan’s economy, such as sesame or gum Arabic, 
evade the oversight of the Ministry of Finance. Hamdok in December 2020 called the involvement of 
the military in civilian industries ‘unacceptable’. In the face of growing controversy, the MIC promised 
to open its books to the Ministry of Finance. But behind the scenes, al-Burhan and Hemedti in late 
2019 and early 2020 competed over the assets of GIS, appointing officers to counter each other’s 
influence in the organization and seizing control of its companies, many of which appeared to have, in 
the end, been transferred to SAF.
51  Phone interview with an observer close to Hemedti, 14 March 2020.
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Under al-Bashir, the government had handed over large tracts of agricultural land to foreign investors, 
including from Gulf countries. Local opposition in many cases prevented these ‘land grabs’ from taking 
off. After al-Bashir fell, the model appears to have changed: companies of the military and security 
sector have invested in agriculture and agro-industry directly and positioned themselves as privileged 
partners of Gulf clients. In April 2021, the government announced Saudi Arabia and the UAE would 
invest $400 million in Sudan’s agriculture.
Private political budgets
While SAF uses its control over its own segments of public finances to entrench its power, Hemedti 
has operated primarily through private political budgets. He had used the Central Bank to deposit the 
payments by the UAE and Saudi Arabia for RSF deployments in Yemen. After the TMC took power in 
April 2019, the UAE delivered him weapons directly, angering the military. Hemedti also appeared to 
enjoy access to vast amounts of cash which he used to purchase loyalties, particularly among armed 
groups. Representatives of groups involved in the Juba peace talks acknowledged their colleagues 
had received such donations. Following critical media coverage of Algunade’s gold dealings, Hemedti 
has diversified in other sectors, including real estate and agriculture, where the dismantling of NISS 
and Islamist corporations has opened up opportunities for taking over those businesses and those 
niches.
Sudan’s 2021 Budget
Sudan’s budget for the 2021 financial year, published by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
in December 2020, offers a partial glimpse into the economic challenges the transitional authorities 
face. It begins with a gloomy review of the past year’s economic performance. The country’s GDP 
has been shrinking for three years in a row. In 2020, it contracted by 4.8 percent: flooding and the 
Covid-19 pandemic aggravated the contraction. Flooding affected crop production, and the pandemic 
undermined the country’s services sector – trade, transport, administration, education, health and 
tourism.52 
Sudan’s new government had to spend quickly on wage rises for civil servants and basic services 
to address the discontents that brought about the 2019 revolution. The complicated compromise 
between security forces and revolutionaries, which ensured that Sudan’s revolutionary death toll was 
much lower than Egypt’s or Libya’s, means that the huge military payroll needs to be maintained. And 
the authorities have had to spend emergency budgets on the Covid-19 pandemic and flooding, which 
hit services and agriculture hard.53  
But as months turned to years after the revolution, the government faced delays in mobilizing the 
resources that are needed to fund the transition. Donors pledged support for Sudan’s transition, but 
political conditions – such as normalization of relations with Israel, or currency devaluation – delayed 
the disbursement of funds.54 The 2020 budget deficit amounted to 4.9 percent of GDP. 
Sudan’s government finances are in deficit and its balance of payments is in deficit too. In 2020, the 
IMF valued Sudan’s goods imports at 25 percent of GDP, and its goods exports at 11 percent of GDP 
– a huge shortfall.55 This trade in goods makes up most of Sudan’s transactions with the rest of the 
world.
After 2012, the government resorted to monetization of deficits because its foreign currency reserves 
were very low and it few domestic or international means to finance deficits: it is highly indebted with 
minimal foreign exchange reserves and that restricts its ability to borrow internationally.56  In 2020, 
the IMF estimated Sudan’s total external public debt at US$ 57.5 billion– about 253 percent of GDP, 
making it one of the most indebted countries in the world.57 Most of the debt is made up of interest 
arrears for loans made decades ago. Sudan’s debts led to its suspension and expulsion from the IMF 
in the period 1986-91. It was readmitted to the IMF in 1997, after the government imposed several 
years of its own drastic austerity agenda on the country. 
Between 1997 and 2014, Sudan agreed fourteen separate IMF Staff-Monitored Programmes. Each 
proposed similar measures: devaluing the exchange rate to make exports more competitive and boost 
52  MOFEP 2020a: 1
53  MOFEP 2020a: 3
54  MOFEP 2020a: 7
55  IMF 2020: 26
56  MOFEP 2020a: 4
57  IMF 2020: 24
20       Sudan’s Political Marketplace in 2021
private-sector led growth; slow the growth of the money supply, so that the government does not print 
money to cover the budget deficit; and cutting the budget deficit, by cutting the consumer subsidies for 
energy, food and medicines that represent the government’s main contribution to public welfare along with 
improved revenue mobilization. Part of the rationale for cutting subsidies was the profiteering made by 
organized smuggling of fuel to neighbouring countries, which not only diverted money into the pockets of 
the military-security elite but meant that peripheral areas never benefited from the subsidies because fuel 
was stolen en route.
These Staff-Monitored Programmes, according to a recent retrospective analysis, ‘generally improved’ GDP 
growth, inflation and the balance of payments, but were not able to deal with Sudan’s debt distress, mainly 
because Sudan was on the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism  until the final weeks of 2020.58 The 
2014 Staff-Monitored Programme was aimed at helping Sudan deal with the loss of oil revenues caused 
by the separation of South Sudan. But it was not completed because the al-Bashir government was not 
prepared to devalue the exchange rate. Sudan had an unusual multiple-exchange rate system which 
effectively subsidizes many imports, and moneyed interests in the security forces and the commercial class 
were clustered inscrutably around the dollar access which this system provided—an over-valued official 
exchange rate was a source of political finance and profiteering even while it was bleeding the country 
and generating unrest. The former government nonetheless pressed ahead with subsidy cuts as part of 
a five-year economic programme. The subsidy cuts contributed to the protests which brought the former 
government down. 
But although everything has changed in Sudan, the latest Staff-Monitored Programme, agreed in October 
2020, has a mix of measures very similar to those of the last one, six years earlier. This time, the government 
has started by taking the difficult decisions at which the former had government balked at. Two months after 
the agreement with the IMF, and against the IMF’s recommendation for a gradual lifting of fuel subsidies, 
the government removed the subsidy with a single stroke.59 They knew this would hit poor households hard. 
It unified Sudan’s multiple exchange rates, which had the effect of devaluing the currency in February 2021, 
from 55 to the prevailing parallel market rate of 375 Sudanese pounds to the US dollar. 
IMF Staff-Monitored Programmes usually call for devaluation, and Sudanese officials historically resisted 
their advice, pointing to a significant body of literature implicating currency devaluations in Sudan’s history 
of high, volatile inflation that is linked to fragmented structure of its economy. The counter-arguments are 
that it is not the official devaluation but the market-led depreciation that is primarily driving the collapse in 
people’s purchasing power, and that a major driver of inflation is the government’s habit of printing money 
to cover deficits. Sudan had double-digit inflation in the 1970s, 1980s and 2010s, and triple-digit inflation 
in the early 1990s and 2020s.60 It was only with ultra-austerity in the mid-1990s and oil-led growth in the 
2000s, that inflation came under control. This time, IMF forecasters do not expect Sudan to emerge from 
triple-digit inflation soon (their GDP-deflator method of deriving inflation rates from production rather than 
consumption understates inflationary experience of ordinary consumers).
IMF projection of inflation rates, using the GDP deflator calculation method.61
58  Ismail 2020: 7
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Nonetheless, Sudan went ahead with a painful devaluation, alongside other reforms, in February 2021. 
And in March, the international community began providing tangible backing for the reforms. Sudan’s 
arrears with the World Bank were cleared, and the IMF promised to mobilize financial resources to 
clear Sudan’s arrears with the Fund. An IMF report hoped that these developments would lead to 
sustained, faster and more inclusive growth.  The economic reforms are risky, said the IMF, but they 
are conditions for debt relief, which requires agreements from different groups of creditors. Debt 
relief, says the IMF, unlocks the public and private investment which are ‘critical to implement Sudan’s 
development agenda and essential reforms.’ Its executive director said on 26 March 2021: ‘Helping 
Sudan achieve debt relief and unlock access to the needed resources to increase growth and reduce 
poverty is a key priority for the IMF.’ 62
Over the past decade, the IMF has paid much more attention to the social impact of the kinds of 
structural adjustment policies it has long advocated. Devaluations and subsidy cuts triggered protests 
in  2012 and 2013, leading to a waves of repression which killed hundreds of protestors, while the 
subsidy removals of 2018 helped bring down the former government. The government, the World Bank 
and the IMF have all agreed on a number of measures to cushion the population from the impacts 
of inflation. The government has committed huge sums to public sector wage rises, and significant 
increases in spending on health and education. In 2019, the IMF recommended that the creation of 
a social safety net ahead of any lifting of subsidies on fuel; donors ultimately pushed the Sudanese 
government to remove subsidies as a condition for funding the safety net. This high-profile initiative, 
known as the Sudan Family Support Programme, is a temporary quasi-universal basic income, meant 
to give 80 percent of Sudanese families an equivalent of US$ 5 per family member per month. The 
programme started in February 2021; donors had agreed in June 2020 to disburse funds, but held 
out until the government devalued the currency, largely because they found it unacceptable to see 
their contributions reduced by a factor of six upon conversion to the artificially high official rate. The 
programme - originally envisaged to cost US$ 1.9 billion - is heavily dependent donor support.63 It is 
unclear whether it will meaningfully counteract the rise in living costs. The IMF projects an inflation 
rate of 111 percent for 2021: other forecasters using different methods have projected that inflation 
will reach 250 percent.64 
The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) argues that the market depreciation of 
the Sudanese pound in 2020 sharply limited Sudan’s ability to import essentials, and increased food 
prices: 
Overall, the Sudanese Pound’s depreciation over the last year has significantly reduced 
government and private sector ability to import essential requirements and increased 
prices of imported and locally produced food and non-food items. Most noncereal food 
items’ prices increased 20-40 percent between January and February 2021 and remained 
50-100 percent higher than in October 2020 and 250-450 percent higher than February 
2020. The rapid depreciation has resulted in a 60-85 percent drop in household purchasing 
power, particularly among urban poor households.
FEWS NET  says that in the countryside, people are increasing their dependence on seasonal 
agricultural labour, artisanal gold mining and petty trade in tea and water to cope. It says that wage 
rates have risen to 500 Sudanese pounds a day on small farms, and 900 Sudanese pounds a day on 
big remote semi-mechanized farms, where many workers are separated from their families (lower 
daily rates are reported by other sources). But the price of basic foods is rising much faster than 
the price of labour.65 Food security experts estimated that over half of Sudan’s population was ‘food 
insecure’ over the second half of 2020, and one fifth of the population faced ‘acute’ or ‘emergency’ food 
insecurity, meaning that they were missing meals, watching their children get malnourished, selling off 
productive assets to feed themselves, and dying before their time.66 
62  IMF 2021: 9, 10, 22
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Nonetheless, the IMF and the government both believe that this time, things will be different. Last 
year, each time the value of the Sudanese pound went down, the cost of subsidizing basic goods 
went up – and the central bank printed money to finance the subsidies, driving up inflation. By ending 
fuel subsidies and tying the value of the pound to that of the parallel market, they hope to end the 
vicious cycle of monetization and inflation and curb corrupt foreign exchange practices. In the IMF’s 
view, this is also a prerequisite for a new cycle to emerge – one that draws in foreign investment 
and remittances, building up foreign reserves that will allow the government to stabilize the currency, 
imports basic necessities which remain subsidized (such as wheat and medicine), and ultimately 
bring the economy back to growth. 
The government can use its new legitimacy and its new foreign friends to build up foreign exchange 
reserves – without them, the devaluation gamble will not work. It has four plausible ways of building 
up those reserves. It hopes that there will be a major increase in foreign grants and loans in 2021, after 
the extremely disappointing sums received last year, before the economic reforms were finalized. It 
may capture into the formal banking sector some of the remittances which are currently lost to the 
informal sector. It could access the reserves held by the myriad state owned-companies, many, if not 
most of which, are held by the military and security sector. But its surest way for Sudan to get enough 
foreign currency is to export more food and minerals. 
Both government and IMF want more than growth, of course. But they also want to ‘lay the groundwork 
for inclusive growth.’  That is a much more ambitious objective.  Over the course of three decades 
of economic reforms and fifteen Staff-Monitored Programmes, Sudan’s economy has tripled or 
quadrupled in dollar value, but it has not yet found a path to growth that is equitable or sustainable. 
Even during Sudan’s oil boom, when government budgets were expanding and Sudan more-or-less 
paid for its imports, relations of production in the agrarian sector remained essentially unchanged. 
Indeed, the oil years were, in retrospect, an interlude during which the fundamentally predatory nature 
of the economy could be overlooked on account of a veneer of prosperity. It is unclear how structural 
reforms as currently envisioned could help Sudan break out of this deeply-embedded pattern.
IV. The Juba Peace Agreement and Security Sector Reform 
The disconnects between Sudan’s different sectors, regions and workforces played a major role in 
the country’s civil wars, which militarized the governance of Sudan’s peripheries. The entanglement of 
war-making and commerce is complicated and only rarely boils down to a straightforward strategy of 
seizing land or assets for profit (the oil field clearance operations being the case in point), but there is 
no doubt that Sudan’s wars have dragged people, places and economic sectors unwillingly into market 
relationships, always at a disadvantage.
These disconnects had a political expression too. President al-Bashir and his predecessors used 
militarized peripheral governance systems to develop its oil industry, whose revenues were used to 
balance budgets and pay off debts – and authoritarian surveillance systems to organize governance 
in the cities. As a result, rural resistance was militarized, while urban resistance was organized around 
campuses, social media, diasporas and old trade union networks. When the peripheries rose in revolt, 
urban dissidents were often unable or unwilling to support them – and city revolts did not synch with 
rural rebellions. 
This disconnect was on full display in 201-20 as peace negotiations in Juba unfolded largely out of 
tempo with Khartoum politics. After the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, the 
Constitutional Declaration in November was amended in line with the peace agreement, extending the 
timelines of Sudan’s transition and expanding transitional institutions to incorporate former rebels. In 
February 2021, former rebels joined the cabinet. 
The agreement brought together the government and armed groups from South Kordofan and Blue 
Nile (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North faction led by Malik Agar) and Darfur 
(the Justice and Equality Movement led by Gibreel Ibrahim, and factions of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army led by Minni Minawi, El-Hadi Idris). Most of these groups were rallied under the 
banner of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a coalition set up in 2011. The Darfuri groups among them 
had been expelled from Darfur during a 2014-16 counter-insurgency campaign led by Hemedti’s RSF. 
The counter-insurgency campaign had been less successful in the Two Areas, where the SPLM-N still 
controlled territory and forces.
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These armed opposition groups argued that their inactive but unfinished insurgencies were part of 
wider national questions about the fraught relationship between successive Khartoum governments 
and Sudan’s vast, diverse peripheries. On this basis, the SRF drew in allied groups with small, partly 
rural constituencies in eastern, northern and central Sudan, which did not have a meaningful history of 
insurgency, were relatively small, and were factions among others in their respective regions.67 
They pushed for separate agreements along five regional tracks (Darfur, Two Areas, Eastern, Central 
and Northern), along with two national protocols dealing with constitutional issues; and refugees, 
displaced persons and migrants. As a result, the agreements are not uniform – some run over 100 
pages, and some are justt five pages long. 
Two important armed opposition groups did not sign the Juba Peace Agreement. One is the faction 
of the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur, which controls forces and territory in Jebel 
Marra, a huge massif which is the only part of Darfur not controlled by the security forces of the central 
government. The other is the faction of the SPLA-N led by Abd al-Aziz Adam al-Hilu, which controls 
territory and militarily credible forces in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Both 
groups have faced pressure to join the peace process, however. On 3 September 2020 – three days 
after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement – al-Hilu signed a preliminary agreement of principles 
with Sudanese premier Abdalla Hamdok in Addis Ababa. On 28 March 2021, he signed a Declaration of 
Principles, along the same lines. And at the beginning of April 2021, SLM/A Abd al-Wahid Nur faction 
sent a representative to Khartoum to begin talks. 
One of the challenges of these negotiations was Sudan’s unwieldy coalition politics. The rebel 
signatories represent a complicated coalition of forces, some with military forces and some without. 
Sudan’s government is a military-civilian coalition, and both military and civilian elements of the 
government are themselves based on coalitions of different security forces, different civil movements, 
and incumbent technocrats. From December 2020, Juba Peace Agreement signatories began joining 
the government too, and they are reshaping Sudan’s coalition of coalitions. 
The Substantive Provisions: A payroll peace?
Over the past two decades, Sudan has signed half a dozen different peace deals that were aimed 
at ending insurgencies in its restive peripheries. These agreements were based around security 
arrangements, which brought rebel soldiers into the army; power-sharing arrangements, which 
brought former rebels into government, and wealth-sharing arrangements, which aimed at redressing 
Sudan’s enormous spatial inequalities by transferring resources from the central government to the 
peripheries. The Juba Peace Agreement followed this template, with separate arrangements for each 
regional track. 
Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought to an end the war between the government 
and the SPLM/A. The agreement came at a time when oil revenues had transformed Sudan’s economy, 
and its signatories recognized that regional inequalities in development needed to be redressed for 
peace to be sustainable. 
The CPA used fiscal measures as the main mechanism for wealth sharing and the main remedy for 
regional inequality. In the 1990s, the central government had radically cut the financial resources 
available local government in the peripheries, defunded social services, and had ramped up the 
extraction of peripheral wealth. After the peace deal was signed, the central government poured a 
significant part of its oil revenues into state governments. Nearly all of this money went on wages: 
the 2005 peace agreement created huge provincial salariats, and did little to address the crises in 
agriculture, or the violence surrounding extractive enclaves, which were mostly oilfields located in the 
southern area of Sudan and present-day South Sudan. Instead of using oil wealth to put the peripheries 
on a track towards sustainable development, the CPA created competition for salaried military and 
civil service posts – and turned rebel leaders into post-allocators, deepening the social fractures of 
the political marketplace.68 
The Juba Peace Agreement provides for thousands of rebel fighters to be incorporated into the military. 
Reshuffles in the cabinet and the sovereignty council in February and March 2021 gave rebel leaders 
67  Signatories from Eastern Sudan were the United People’s Front for Liberation and Justice and the Beja Congress in Oppo-
sition, led by Osama Said. Signatories from Northern Sudan were the Kush Liberation Movement and the North Entity, led by Dahab 
Ibrahim Dahab. The signatory from Central Sudan was the Democratic Unionist Party – Revolutionary Wing led by Al-Tom Hajjo.  
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senior positions in government, and they will get to choose representatives for an interim, appointed 
legislative assembly, which will sit until elections planned for 2023. Provincial civil services will be 
more inclusive of rebel constituencies. In some respects, the new agreement looks like the CPA’s 
‘payroll peace.’ But unlike the CPA, the Juba Peace Agreement is not backed by any real resources. The 
2021 budget cut transfers from the federal government to state governments, and raised allocations 
for basic income and social welfare programmes run from the capital.69 
If all goes according to the plan, Sudan’s eighteen states will be grouped into regions, whose number 
and borders will be defined by a national conference. These sub-national administrations will play 
a central role in delivering social services and managing reconstruction and development. These 
operations will be only partly financed from central government revenues. The rest will come from a 
list of two dozen taxes, on land, business profits, income – and also on agricultural production and 
livestock. Sub-national administrations will even be allowed to contract international loans. (Sudan is 
unlikely to contract any foreign loans before it has renegotiated existing debts). Primary producers 
may have to increase surplus production to finance these administrations. 
Will the peace agreements lead to a reconsideration of Sudan’s unequal path to growth? The agreements 
open up the possibility of dialogue on ways forward. The Darfur track of the agreement calls for a 
commission for the pastoralist sector, which will develop a ten-year strategy aimed at organizing 
migration routes, providing production and service centres and water resources along migration routes, 
improving productivity, protecting the environment, limiting tensions with agricultural groups, providing 
education and other services to pastoralists. Darfur and other tracks set up land commissions. The 
Central and Eastern track agreements call for the rehabilitation of neglected agricultural infrastructure, 
and two national agreements provide commissions for refugees and displaced persons, and better 
housing for migrant workers. 
Proposals from these commissions will, however, be difficult to finance. They may impose additional 
burdens on rural producers before offering them tangible benefits. Like the CPA before it, the Juba 
Peace Agreement solution to the crises in the peripheries is to first give rebel commanders ranks and 
access to cash –  rather than investing in rural production systems or rural social services. Elements 
of the government and their former rebel opponents both come from these rural areas – Hemedti 
signed the security agreements with his former adversaries. The commanders who signed these 
agreements have different immediate strategies. For some, it is to control and extract resources from 
localities to advance their political careers. For others it is to secure an allocation of rent from the 
central government to secure their positions at home. For others still, they are constrained to play in 
the political market for survival, hoping at some point to pursue other aims such as improving their 
people’s lot. None are in a position to change the relations of production in provincial Sudan, even if 
they wanted to do so.
The enduring extraction-first political economy underpins the political marketplace. The interests of 
Sudan’s rulers in Khartoum, and the militias – and even the insurgents who sign peace deals – lie 
in the maintenance of the extractive system. Their efforts go into the consumption economy of the 
centre rather than the productive struggles of the peripheries. Cash is still the pathway to participation 
in this economy. 
Security Sector Reform
Security sector reform was a central demand of both protesters who brought down al-Bashir’s regime 
and the armed groups that signed the Juba Agreement. In signing the agreement, military leaders 
(however reluctantly) acknowledged to that such reform is necessary. But these groups have different 
incentives and consequently differing ideas of how such reform should be prioritized and sequenced. 
As yet, no combination of interests has been able to unite in sufficient strength to push through a 
reform agenda that could offer an alternative to the ‘business as usual’ marketplace playbook that 
has essentially always governed the provision of security services and division of security-related 
resources. As reform momentum has stalled out, various groups have moved quickly to secure their 
own interests and relative positions as best they can. However, as noted elsewhere, the resources 
that supported previous marketplace dynamics are gone for good. The consequences of attempts to 
reconstruct the previous security status quo when the conditions that produced and supported it no 
longer pertain remain extremely unclear. 
69  MOFEP 2020: 7
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The Sudanese army and police look back with nostalgia on an era in which they were truly professional 
and apolitical. That is something of a myth. The security services have been politicized and 
instrumentalized by since the colonial era and the first coup in 1958. However, as described elsewhere 
in this piece, the current highly fragmented structure is a consequence of the former regime playing 
different security force factions and peripheral armed groups off against one another. This system has 
always been turbulent, with ambitious regional leaders and their (shifting groups of) followers moving 
between a variety of possible roles – rebels, ‘reintegrated’ members of the official security forces, un-
or-semi official militia forces deployed against rebels, and serious competitors for central state power 
– as market conditions and possible bargains changed.  
One of the most pernicious legacies of this dynamic stems from the fact that various security forces 
were so often paid in concessions rather than cash. The Sudanese economy is massively distorted 
by the pervasive presence of military companies and other interests operating on privileged terms 
throughout a wide variety of industries.70 Sudan’s peripheries are impoverished by the longstanding 
practice of official, semi-official, and rebel forces funding themselves (whether with regime authorization 
or independently) through looting, dubious forms of taxation, profit-sharing with local merchants and 
control over natural resource extraction and export (licit and illicit). The switch to an exclusively salary-
based compensation system is a fraught task further complicated by multiple competing demands 
– the need to shrink the security forces to an affordable size, the need to expand police services (or 
come up with alternative local security options) in a difficult-to-police geographic and political context, 
and the need to avoid alienating current members of the security forces to the point of triggering 
mutinies and coup attempts. 
The priority security sector reform demands of urban civil society interests – youth, businesspeople, 
union members, and state employees among others – were and are to rapidly place all security 
forces under civilian control, establish civilian oversight over security sector income and budgets, 
and end security force involvement in civilian industries. These changes are likely critical for Sudan’s 
economic revival, or even survival  – as members of this constituency point out, the security sector 
consumes a massive portion of Sudan’s economy.71 The FFC’s Economic Committee has warned that 
the unreformed 2021 National Budget ‘will lead to economic collapse.’72 Further, military favouritism, 
corruption, and the threat of expropriation and/or extortion are among the factors that keep much-
needed foreign investment out of key sectors including agriculture.73 The FFC and the civilian-led 
government have not been able to address the military-commercial complex effectively thus far, their 
hands tied by the slow process of normalizing Sudan’s international economic standing.
Sudan might have made more progress in the twin tasks of SSR and disengaging the military from 
commerce if, early in the transition period, the FFC had had more leverage due to a firmer alliance 
with leaders (armed and otherwise) in Sudan’s peripheries, and/or with the portions of the divided 
military most open to reform. The first of these possible alliances was blocked by deep historical 
mistrust rooted in Khartoum’s longstanding exploitation of and marginalization of Sudan’s peripheries, 
reinforced by the FFC’s prioritization of power-sharing with the military over engaging in the peace 
process. Even more immediately urban civil society and peripheral groups have voiced very different 
SSR priorities – as mentioned, the need for the security forces to shrink (both due to budgetary 
constraints and to limit their future power) is in direct tension with peripheral group demands that a 
sizable percentage of their forces be reintegrated into these forces. 
The path of alliance with sympathetic military factions, which would have seen Sudan following an 
SSR trajectory successful in a number of other states, was also impeded by the intense competition 
between the SAF and the RSF. Neither group is at all likely to pursue reforms that reduce access to 
resources while the other is willing and able to take competitive advantage of the situation, especially 
in a context where the total pool of available resources has dwindled. 
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The RSF has sought to replace lost revenue through mercenary rents from fighters in Yemen, among 
other things by using coercive ‘DDR’ efforts to seize weapons, vehicles, and other resources from 
armed communities and groups for its own use or profitable resale.74 These coercive efforts have the 
additional impact of signaling to peripheral populations that, regardless of what agreements may have 
been signed, old patterns of exploitation, resistance, and bargaining through violence are still primary 
tools of Sudanese politics. 
Whether spurred by security force coercion or not, when violence breaks out in the periphery, as it 
currently has in Darfur, security forces find themselves with another excuse to resist disarmament and 
downsizing. This anti-reform rationale has been further bolstered by recent clashes and the prospect 
of further conflict with Ethiopia, both over the contested border district of al-Fashaga as well as the 
breakdown of negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.75 
For peripheral armed groups who have signed onto the Juba Accords through various separate 
agreements, the division between the RSF, SAF, and civilian government leaders creates a problem of 
uncertainty – how can ‘the government’ be trusted to keep commitments if no single faction is powerful 
enough to follow through, or can be relied upon to keep power for long? Perhaps unsurprisingly, across 
agreements with different groups, the most consistent and detailed security-related demands relate 
to DDR, and specifically to reintegration.76 Past experience has demonstrated to these groups that 
reintegration programmes can be a source of resources even if lasting peace seems unlikely – groups 
members ‘reintegrated’ into regular forces receive salaries, training, and other benefits, and always 
retain the option of renewed rebellion if conditions change.77 
Past patterns of behaviour intended to maximize various armed group bargaining power and potential 
gains from DDR have recently reemerged – various groups have been recruiting new members prior 
to cantonment, as well as allegedly selling military ranks (which allow purchasers to qualify for more 
lucrative positions once reintegrated or larger buy-out packages if demobilized).78 These reports are 
particularly concerning because of the potential gap between group member expectations of DDR 
packages and what Sudan can currently afford. The violent mutiny which broke out among former 
members of the NISS when their severance packages were reduced is a worrying sign of the likely 
reaction of both official security forces and armed groups to disappointments yet to come.79 These 
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issues are exacerbated by the basic uncertainty of how to manage reintegration given the SAF/RSF 
rivalry – if a single Sudanese military does not seem likely to exist in the near future, how can peripheral 
forces be folded into it? 
Another common feature of peripheral group agreements with the government is a commitment to 
establishing interim security arrangements combined with vagueness about what those arrangements 
might look like.80 Boiler-plate language in many agreements calling on the Sudanese National Police 
to continue to provide basic security services glosses over the fact that in many areas, the police 
have had little to no presence for a prolonged period of time, and are unlikely to establish one with 
the resources currently available to them.81 In the best case scenarios, this leaves security services in 
various regions unchanged – they will continue to be provided by whatever combination of traditional 
and community safety organizations and armed groups are currently in place. Given the lack of local 
accountability mechanisms and tendency of many armed groups to fund themselves through local 
predation, ordinary people are unlikely to see gains in the personal security or access to justice. In worse 
situations, such as the violent clashes currently occurring in Darfur, the withdrawal of international 
security guarantors and the competition by various armed groups to consolidate their position in the 
resulting security vacuum leads to escalating violence, which official security forces may use as a 
pretext to re-occupy territory.82  In no scenario do proposed security and justice consultations with 
ordinary citizens seem likely to be held.83
While external actors have so far played constructive roles providing sanctions and debt relief, they 
have yet to do much specifically to forward SSR. The United States’ announced plans to support the 
Sudanese security sector through targeted training seem extremely unlikely to ameliorate any of the 
structural barriers to reform.84 The major international actors in the region have yet to take serious 
action to discourage the use of Sudanese troops as mercenaries in regional conflicts. The shape and 
extent of external support to DDR is as yet uncertain – if, as seem likely, less aid is available than in 
previous rounds of peacemaking, the consequences are unclear. In the short term, as discussed, a 
gap between what is available and what armed groups expect to receive may lead to violence and 
local predation. However, in the long term, if various actors decide that the revenue streams that 
funded previous marketplace arrangements are unlikely to return, they may be more open to accepting 
security sector reforms that might guarantee them a more reliable piece of a smaller pie. 
This calculation is true for SSR in Sudan in general – the fragmented interests and different incentives 
of the groups described make it hard to see how a sufficient coalition could come together around and 
successfully implement a pro-reform agenda. However, as the overthrow of Sudan’s previous regime 
demonstrated and current turbulent regional and economic conditions highlight, interests, incentives, 
group memberships, and inter-group alliances continue to shift quickly – conditions that allow for a 
more cohesive pro-SSR coalition may well emerge in future, especially if pro-reform actors are able to 
learn from present failures. 
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V. Case Study: Eastern Sudan
Eastern Sudan is a microcosm of Sudan’s political economy and a cockpit for its regionally-integrated 
political marketplace. The eastern provinces of Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref contain the country’s 
outlet to the sea and second most important trading centre (Port Sudan), its most profitable commercial 
farming zone (Gedaref) along with important irrigated schemes and a large population of pastoralists. 
It borders Egypt, Eritrea and Ethiopia and has a maritime boundary with Saudi Arabia across the Red 
Sea. Each of the land borders has been the site of boundary disputes and military action, including 
reciprocal support to proxy guerrilla forces, and the Red Sea coast is also a major smuggling route for 
contraband, arms and human migrants. The region is also one of the poorest and most food insecure, 
with health and educational rankings among the worst in Sudan.
The political stakes in Eastern Sudan are high. Successive governments in Khartoum have paid lip 
service to the need for investment in sustainable development and, especially after the 2006 Eastern 
Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) that followed the CPA, drafted ambitious plans to achieve those 
laudable goals. But the real politics were transactional. This did not change after the 2019 revolution. 
The Juba talks included an ‘Eastern Track’ and during the negotiations and after the signing of the 
Juba Agreement, the tactical bargains struck did not indicate either an inclusive or a durable political 
settlement, and still less a path towards the kind of structural reform that would make democracy 
meaningful. Instead there was an outburst of armed conflict, a sad illustration of the unsustainable 
nature of deals that accommodate peripheral crises primarily through elite co-optation, fuelling cycles 
of rebellion – accommodation.85 
The East is a region of great diversity. It is the home to speakers of Tu-Bedawyi (a Cushitic language), 
such as the Beja tribes of the Hadendowa, Amr’ar, and Bishariyyin; speakers of Tigre (a Semitic 
language), such as the Beni Amer people and Habab tribe; Arabic speakers, including the Rashaida, 
who have roots in the Arabian Peninsula, people with roots in the Nile Valley, and the Shukriyya; and 
populations who originate from Darfur, Kordofan – notably the Nuba Mountains – and even West 
Africa.86
Speakers of Tu-Bedawyi have been present in the area for millennia, and claim right to the land. 
Speakers of Tigre, such as the Beni Amer and the Habab, on the other hand, straddle Sudan and 
Eritrea and hold little customary land in Sudan, though they have a long history in parts of Eastern 
Sudan. Since the 1960s, successive waves of migration from Eritrea have considerably increased Beni 
Amer numbers, putting them in increasing competition with Hadendowa and other Beja tribes (Local 
actors and scholars alike debate whether the term ‘Beja people’ encompasses both Tu-Bedawyi and 
Tigre speakers or the speakers of Tu-Bedawyi exclusively).87 As for groups which trace roots to other 
parts of Sudan, to the Peninsula or to West Africa, many of them have been in Eastern Sudan for 
decades or, in some cases, centuries, coming in waves of migration resulting from war, the expansion 
of mechanized agriculture and port activities, and the building of dams. The Rashaida, for instance, 
came to Sudan in the 19th century, while Nuba presence in Port Sudan dates back to the colonial era. 
Displacement internal to the East has further mixed the region’s demographic map: in the 1980s and 
‘90s, famine and drought pushed rural pastoralist populations (such as Hadendowa and Beni Amer 
people) into cities, putting them in competition with other groups.88
Like other peripheral regions of Sudan, the East suffers from long-standing neglect by the central 
government, which has fuelled persistent grievances and tension. On the one hand, limited economic 
opportunities and the organization of economic activity around communal lines have given ethnic 
overtones to competition over resources, as in the case of recurrent conflict between Nuba and 
Beni Amer neighbourhoods in Port Sudan, which has flared up again since 2019. On the other hand, 
discontent over the lack of development and marginalization have encouraged political and sometimes 
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military mobilization against Khartoum. The Beja Congress is Sudan’s oldest regional political party, 
founded shortly before independence. Its first flag depicted the inland delta of the Gash river, a dry 
season grazing reserve that had been confiscated by the colonial authorities to grow irrigated cotton. 
The party was fissiparous but resilient and in the early 1990s, with support from Eritrea, turned to 
armed rebellion. The insurgency ended in 2006 when the Eastern Front, a coalition led by the Beja 
Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions, signed the ESPA with the NCP. Its signatories entered an 
alliance with the government: Musa Mohammed Ahmed, the leader of the Beja Congress, went on to 
become adviser to Bashir, and supported his re-election.89 
The co-option of the ESPA signatories fitted a broader trend; in the East as elsewhere, Bashir’s 
government played divide-and-rule, buying off local elites who could claim to speak for large and restive 
constituencies, while simultaneously undermining them by empowering less influential groups. In the 
mid 1990s, the government had replaced the nazir (paramount chief) of the Hadendowa, the largest 
of the Tu-Bedawyi-speaking Beja tribes, with his son, Sayyid Tirik,90 who became a NCP MP in the 
Kassala state parliament.91 In parallel, the government sought to weaken the Hadendowa leadership 
with plans to promote the leader of the Jimelab, a segment of the Hadendowa, to the rank of nazir.92 
The security services and the NCP, meanwhile, were said to recruit largely among the Beni Amer, 
one of two Tigre-speaking groups, counterbalancing the influence of the Hadendowa, which formed 
the main constituency behind the Beja Congress.93 The government also empowered smaller groups, 
promoting in 2006 the leader of the Habab from the lower rank of umda to that of nazir, on par with 
larger groups.94
The transition began in a context of factional conflict between co-opted local leaders, whose popularity 
had been declining, and their challengers affiliated to the opposition. By 2010-11, many within the 
groups that were signatories to the ESPA were getting impatient at the lack of implementation of key 
components of the agreement, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs. 
Grievances also mounted over embezzlement in the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development 
Fund, a program endowed with hundreds of millions of dollars. The Beja Congress split, its leader 
Musa Mohammed Ahmed (who was involved in the management of the ESRDF) remaining loyal to 
Bashir’s government.95 In 2014, Musa Mohammed Ahmed took part in Bashir’s ‘national dialogue’,96 
which was rejected by many opposition groups at the time as a diversion tactic. Eastern dissidents 
joined the opposition: a faction of the Beja Congress in 2011 joined the SRF, followed in 2013 by 
another Beja Congress splinter group, the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice. 97 
Regime change in 2019 shook up the political alignments. Political change at the centre contributed to 
a power vacuum in the East and to uncertainty over the local balance of forces. Past association with 
Bashir’s government became politically toxic for local leaders, threatening the position of individuals 
such as Musa Mohammed Ahmed, Sayyid Tirik, the Nazir of the Hadendowa, and their associate 
Sayyid Ali Abu Amna (a leader of the United Popular Front for Liberation of Justice, Abu Amna, had, 
after a stint in the opposition, left the SRF and resumed cooperation with the government, joining 
Bashir’s national dialogue).98
In parallel, the rise of the FFC to central government through the Constitutional Declaration, and the 
empowerment of the SRF through the Juba talks, brought to prominence Eastern politicians who 
had opposed Bashir. In Juba, the SRF representatives from Eastern Sudan, led by Ossama Said (who 
is from the Ababda, a Beja tribe, and represents a faction of the Beja Congress) and Al-Amin Daoud 
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(who is Beni Amer and was the leader of an opposition branch of the UPFLJ), successfully advocated 
for an ‘Eastern Track’ that would address the issues of the region. But their newfound role met fierce 
resistance from Tirik, Ahmed, and Abu Amna. Ahmed initially expressed support for the Juba process 
and the revolution. But after the FFC, citing his tainted association with the NCP, asked him to step 
down from his leadership of the Beja Congress, he turned and demanded the freezing of the Eastern 
Track process.99 Alongside Tirik and Abu Amna, he mobilized on an ethnic basis, claiming to represent 
the Bejas and denouncing Beni Amer, such as Al-Amin Daoud, as foreigners.
The ethnic gambit of Ahmed, Tirik and Abu Amna served multiple purposes. It enabled them to sweep 
aside their association with the former regime. It undermined the legitimacy of political figures of the 
SRF, now branded as foreigners, who competed with them for representation in and of the East. It 
sought to position Tirik as the representative of the Bejas, to place Hadendowas as the vanguard of 
Bejas, and to make Bejas as the central government’s main interlocutor in the East, irrespective of the 
region’s diverse demographic realities. 
In November 2019, Tirik, Ahmed and Abu Amna mobilized to prevent Al-Amin Daoud from holding in 
Port Sudan a public event aimed at promoting the Juba process, prompting clashes pitting Beni Amers 
against Hadendowas .100 A few days later, on 23 November, Tirik, Ahmed, and Abu Amna created the 
‘High Council of the Beja Nazarat and Independent Umoodiyat.’101 It was a misnomer: out of seven Beja 
nazirs, only Tirik joined the Council. The six other nazirs rejected the initiative.102 Yet the body claimed 
to represent the Bejas of Eastern Sudan. 
Tensions came to a head in 2020 over the appointments of new governors and the conclusion of 
agreements in Juba. Following the clashes in Port Sudan, the UPFLJ changed its leader, removing 
Al-Amin Daoud and replacing him with Khalid Idriss (who is from Kassala and is also Beni Amer). In 
February 2020, the government and the Eastern representatives of the SRF – Ossama Said and Khalid 
Idriss – signed the Eastern Track agreement.103 In July 2020, Hamdok appointed Salih Ammar, a FFC 
figure who is Beni Amer, as governor of Kassala.
In subsequent months, Tirik, Ahmed and Abu Amna, now leaders of the ‘High Council of the Beja 
Nazarat’ actively mobilized to block both the Eastern Track agreement and Ammar’s appointment. 
The High Council blocked the strategic Khartoum – Port Sudan highway on two occasions, as well as 
the port terminal of Port Sudan.104 Clashes broke out between Beni Amer and supporters of the High 
Council in Port Sudan in August. That same month, Hadendowas attacked Beni Amer supporters of 
Salih Ammar who were marching to demand that he take his position as state governor in Kassala; 
one person was killed and scores injured in the ensuing clashes.105 Tirik in August reportedly survived 
an assassination attempt in Kassala, which his allies blamed on Beni Amer.106
Coming in the context of renewed clashes between Nuba and Beni Amer in the East, the High Council’s 
strategy of ethnic mobilization against Beni Amer stoked communal tension in the region. Citing 
security concerns, state-owned companies in the region reportedly told Beni Amer staff not to come 
to work.107 Local actors and observers describe processes of segregation as residents move out of 
neighbourhoods where they are in the minority, and growing efforts among Bejas, Beni Amer and 
Nubas to purchase weapons.108
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In September 2020, the High Council organized the ‘Sinkat Peace and Development Conference’ which 
‘fully’ mandated Tirik to speak for Bejas, reiterated its rejection of the Juba process and Ammar’s 
appointment, demanded self-determination for Bejas,109 and called on the government to review 
‘regulations on foreign presence in the region’, a reference to a demand to review the citizenship of 
Beni Amers who were naturalized under the Bashir government.110 In a classic case of firefighter 
arsonist, the High Council days later denounced the Eastern Track agreement as a source of ‘violence 
and discord’.111 
Whether in response to rising tensions or as part of a premeditated plan, the military coordinated 
with the High Council’s leaders to position them as privileged representatives of the East and impose 
their preferences, regardless of the fact they could, at best, claim to speak a fraction of Eastern 
constituencies. Tirik is said to be frequently meeting with Burhan and Hemedti.112 Under pressure 
from the military, which reportedly warned against an escalation of violence in the East,113 Hamdok 
on 14 October eventually dismissed Ammar. This major concession to Tirik, Ahmed and Abu Amna 
drew condemnation from other traditional Beja leaders, including the Nazar of the Beni Amer, Habab, 
Jimelab, and Bishariyyin, as well as from traditional leaders from other communities present in the 
East, such as the Massalit, Hausa, Nubas, and Shukriyya.114 It also dealt a blow to the FFC’s attempts 
to expand their social base in the East.
At the time of writing, signatories of the Eastern Track agreement complain that the government had 
frozen its implementation, despite statements by Sovereignty Council member Gen. Shamseddine 
al-Kabbashi in January that the agreement would ‘definitely’ proceed.115 A large part of the hoped-
for progress is the allocation of posts, the reorganization of administrative structures and the direct 
payments made to members of armed groups. The promised economic transformations are less 
immediate and all signatories implicitly recognize that they may, like similar provisions in earlier 
agreements, be aspirational only.
The micro-politics of Eastern Sudan are a classic case of turbulence: shifting alliances and tactical 
deal-making using money, violence and threats of violence, and access to brokering positions with 
more powerful authorities, making for unpredictable changes over the short term, but replicating 
essentially the same structure and pattern in the longer term. Many local politicians saw the changes 
in Khartoum in 2019-20, not as a once-in-a-generation shift in the country’s political direction, but a 
shakeup of the political market. 
Leaders of the Hadandawa, Beni Amer and Nubas agree in their fear that the resulting tensions and 
dynamics of mobilization could break out into widespread violence, organized primarily along ethnic 
or tribal lines.116 By empowering groups with a narrow base on the basis of their proximity to armed 
groups from Darfur and the Two Areas, the Juba process exemplified a political marketplace logic 
that puts political figures who are best placed to broker deals at the centre of the political process. 
In Eastern Sudan, this antagonized the region’s previous brokers. Threatened by regime change and 
the Juba process, they reacted by demonstrating their disruptive capacity and ultimately positioned 
themselves as primary interlocutors for the central government. Local competition over brokerage 
positions only reinforced the political marketplace logic and compelled the government to act in crisis 
management mode.
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Conclusion: Reversion to Type?
Two years after the momentous civic revolution that brought down the regime of President al-Bashir, 
the deep structural impasse that constrains Sudan’s leaders is clear for all to see. Democrats and 
soldiers alike, whether from the metropolis or the peripheries, have been unable to alter the basic 
political-economic predicament of Sudan, namely its distorted system of production that relies on 
over-exploitation of the labour of the poor and the natural resources of the country. Both cause and 
consequence of this failure is the entrenched nature of transactional politics, in which politicians are 
constrained to use a combination of violence and bribery to remain politically relevant and to become 
masters of these instruments if they are to obtain and wield power. This remains the case for the 
local chief, the provincial politician, the ambitious member of the Khartoum elite, and for the country’s 
leaders as the face the merciless realpolitik of the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley and the Arabian 
Peninsula. The Sudanese revolution risks reverting to political business as usual, albeit with a different 
set of protagonists, and new civic and personal freedoms.
The analysis of Sudan’s political marketplace in August 2019117 concluded that the country was 
not likely to exit the political marketplace (as hoped for by the democracy protesters) but rather to 
reconfigure it. Without the normalization of Sudan’s international economic standing and an injection 
of sufficient funds to stabilize the macro-economic crisis, a counter-revolution or a repressive turn 
was quite possible. There have been rumblings of these but to date the coalition among the security 
actors and between them and the civilians has held.
The new cabinet announced in February 2021 was highly political, in the sense that the nominations 
were based on political weight and not technocratic merit. It was a stark demonstration of the logic 
of the political marketplace prevailing over the aspirations of the civic revolutionaries for a fresh start. 
It was an indication that the government would be concerned with managing politics and associated 
crises rather than actually transforming Sudan. 
The urban civic groups clustered under the FFC, including the SPA, the politicized civil society groups, 
and civilian parties did not form a coherent bloc. They did not possess the institutional or organic 
cohesion whereby their constituencies – the people whom they could mobilize for demonstrations 
or the voters they can potentially turn out at the polls – could translate into real political power. The 
democratic transition has therefore fallen into a trough, with the street demobilized and the elections 
still on the horizon, power is transacted largely by the old methods of coercion, bribery and scheming. 
Still an outsider to the metropolitan establishment, Hemedti is seeking to position himself as the 
protector of the revolution and patron of the peripheries, but remains an outsider to the Khartoum 
establishment. Al-Burhan has consolidated his position as the de facto head of state and protector of 
state institutions, including notably the army.
Neither have the provincial armed groups formed a coherent bloc. The Juba Agreement brought 
many of them—in general the weaker ones—into government through an expensive buy-in, which has 
had the effect of pressurizing the stronger provincial rebels (al-Hilu and Abd al-Wahid) to petition for 
compromises that they would not have had to make, had the armed groups as a whole been better 
organized. Each of those that has signed the Juba Agreement is pursuing its own strategy, building its 
own alliances with whatever civilian groups or military and security factions are most amenable. Their 
subordinate positions are thereby confirmed. 
Sudan is therefore suspended between revolution and counter-revolution. Divisions between SAF and 
the RSF, combined with international attention (in particular the newfound U.S. engagement, with its 
focus on security sector reform) make a coup difficult. The soldiers need the civilian government for 
legitimacy, just as the civilians cannot challenge the dominant position of the military in the political 
economy and the real transactional politics. This political equilibrium will come under challenge as the 
questions of constitutional reform and elections come to the fore in 2022-23.
Economically, Sudan may achieve macroeconomic stabilization and attract sufficient foreign direct 
investment for its economy to begin to grow again. There is an ever-present danger that the country will 
revert to its tried, tested and failed model that depends upon exploiting natural resources and labour 
in a manner that will, once again, prove unsustainable. However, more ‘inclusive growth’ is possible. 
It needs committed engagement with the multiple, self-reproducing crises in its rural production 
systems – which will be the engine of future national economic performance. 
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There are some grounds for optimism. The government’s macro-economic stabilization plans include 
a welcome, albeit temporary, stimulus package in the form of a quasi-universal basic income, and 
long-overdue investment in education and health systems. In the medium term, the government needs 
to invest in social services in a way that generates jobs, protects public health, and reduces the huge 
burdens borne by rural producers and informal urban workers. Inclusive growth also needs creative 
thinking about the ways out of the rural crises. One of the achievements of the Juba Peace Agreement 
negotiators was to identify some of these crises: new strategies for the pastoralist sector, providing 
production and service centres and water resources along migration routes; land commissions; 
the rehabilitation of neglected agricultural infrastructure, a commission for refugees and displaced 
persons, and a commission to improve housing and conditions for migrant workers. These are some 
of Sudan’s top priorities. But the tragedy of the political marketplace is that the routine intrigues of 
transactional politics act as an all-consuming distraction from what really matters to build the political-
economic foundations for democratic change.
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